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  The provision point mechanism mitigates free-riding behavior in economic experiments. In 
two contingent valuation method surveys, we implement the provision point design. We ask 
respondents for their perceptions about the success of the provision point mechanism. We find 
that respondents who believe that the provision point would not be met are more likely to say 
no to a contingent valuation dichotomous choice question. The scenario rejection that arises 
may result in biased willingness-to-pay estimates. 
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The contingent valuation method (CVM) elicits 
hypothetical statements of willingness to pay. 
Therein lies its greatest weakness and its greatest 
strength. Critics of CVM argue that its hypotheti-
cal nature leads to responses that do not measure 
the true valuation of a good in question, either 
through biases from construction of the questions 
(i.e., starting-point bias), strategic answering of 
questions (i.e., free-riding), or inability of respon-
dents to understand or accept the hypothetical sce-
nario and questions (i.e., scenario rejection). Yet 
the hypothetical nature of CVM is also its greatest 
strength. There are no direct markets and no re-
vealed preference data that can be used to meas-
ure non-use values of environmental goods and 
assess the benefits of many policy proposals. 
  To help minimize the potential bias from the 
hypothetical nature of questions in CVM, Mitchell 
and Carson (1989, p. 30) state that a hypothetical 
scenario “must be informative; clearly under-
stood; realistic by relying upon established pat-
terns of behavior and legal institutions; have uni-
form application to all respondents; and, hope-
fully, leave the respondent with a feeling that the 
situation and his responses are not only credible 
but important.” Carson and Groves (2007) show 
that when a survey question is consequential (i.e., 
a respondent finds that the question potentially 
influences an agent’s action and the respondent 
cares about the action), standard economic theory 
applies. CVM researchers have taken these sug-
gestions to heart and developed techniques to 
address hypothetical bias, the free-rider effect, 
starting-point bias, and other concerns. In the 
process, the resulting highly structured hypo-
thetical scenarios that have become standard best-
practice may not be perceived as plausible to all 
respondents. 
  When respondents find contingent valuation 
questions implausible, scenario rejection may 
arise. Scenario rejection may take the form of 
protest responses, where respondents with posi-
tive willingness to pay will reveal only a zero 
willingness-to-pay value in an open-ended will-
ingness-to-pay question, or answer no to a di-
chotomous choice willingness-to-pay question 
even though their true willingness to pay is 
greater than the bid amount. Widespread scenario 
rejection will invalidate the results of a CVM 
survey. If more limited scenario rejection is dealt 
with by excluding cases, the reduction in sample 
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size will potentially bias the sample and decrease 
the efficiency of willingness-to-pay estimates. 
Ignoring scenario rejection will increase the vari-
ance of willingness-to-pay estimates and is likely 
to bias willingness to pay downwards. 
  Little attention has been paid to protest bids 
resulting from scenario rejection in past CVM 
research. Desvousges, Smith, and Fisher (1983) 
first addressed the identification of protest bid-
ders by using regression diagnostics to identify 
outliers based on income. Halstead, Luloff, and 
Stevens (1992) use follow-up debriefing ques-
tions in an attempt to identify protest bidders. 
They find that respondents may answer no to a 
dichotomous choice question due to protest of the 
payment vehicle. Clinch and Murphy (2001) pur-
sue what has become the typical strategy in deal-
ing with protest bids by asking respondents who 
are unwilling to pay for their primary reason. 
Protest bidders are identified as those who seem 
to be willing to pay for the good but indicate 
otherwise due to scenario rejection or other bias. 
Protest bidders are then discarded from the 
sample. 
  In this study we pursue a different strategy 
when dealing with protest bids. We use respon-
dent perceptions about the feasibility of the hy-
pothetical scenario to determine aspects of sce-
nario design that lead to variation in willingness 
to pay. These perceptions can be used to explic-
itly test for the protest responses and assess the 
sensitivity of willingness to pay to the protest. In 
particular, we focus on protest responses that 
arise due to the provision point mechanism which 
has been used to mitigate free-riding with the 
voluntary contribution payment mechanism in 
laboratory (Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe 1999, Rose 
et al. 2002) and field experiments (Rose et al. 
2002, Poe et al. 2002). 
 
Provision Point Mechanism 
 
In a provision point mechanism, individuals are 
asked to donate money to pay for a public good, 
but told that the donated funding will not be used 
for the public good unless some lower bound 
threshold is met. This threshold is defined as the 
provision point. If the threshold is not met then 
the donations will be refunded to the individuals. 
The provision point gives individuals an incentive 
to donate a positive amount because of the all-or-
nothing construction. In this framework, only if 
sufficient donations are received will the public 
good be provided. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) 
show that the provision point framework alters an 
individual dominant strategy in a non-cooperative 
game and that in some cases an efficient level of a 
public good is achieved through donation. Marks 
and Crosson (1998) show that a provision point 
mechanism with a money-back guarantee helps to 
avoid the perception that donations might flow to 
unrelated projects if the primary project is not 
funded. 
 Laboratory  experimental evidence and field 
survey research have found that the provision 
point mechanism has lessened the free-rider ef-
fects found with the straight voluntary contribu-
tion mechanism (Bagnoli and McKee 1991, 
Cadsby and Maynes 1999, Rose et al. 2002, Ron-
deau, Poe, and Schulze 2005, and Messer, Kaiser, 
and Schmidt 2005). Bagnoli and McKee (1991) 
find that in a laboratory setting a provision point 
is met most of the time when a refund is used. 
Cadsby and Maynes (1999), also in a laboratory 
setting, find that a refund in a provision point 
design is effective when the provision point is a 
relatively high amount. Rondeau, Poe, and Schulze 
(2005) note that in a field setting, however, non-
profit organizations are reluctant to use the pro-
vision point mechanism with the money-back 
guarantee because of the probability that the 
response will not meet the threshold and the pro-
ject will not be funded. Norwood et al. (2006) 
also suggest that a provision point introduces risk 
into the public provision process, particularly 
when the benefit-to-cost ratio is low and a full 
refund is required. Yet Poe et al. (2002) suggest 
that using the provision point mechanism in field 
contingent-valuation method surveys provides 
incentives to respondents to truthfully reveal their 
willingness to pay as in laboratory and field 
experiments. 
  Champ et al. (2002) implement the provision 
point with money-back guarantee mechanism in a 
contingent valuation survey and compare it to a 
voluntary contribution mechanism and a referen-
dum on a tax payment. Contrary to past theoreti-
cal and empirical research, the willingness to pay 
from the provision point mechanism is not sig-
nificantly different from that from the voluntary 
contribution mechanism. There is weak evidence 
that willingness to pay is greater for the referen-
dum treatment. Champ et al. (2002) ask respon-Groothuis and Whitehead  The Provision Point Mechanism and Scenario Rejection in Contingent Valuation   273 
 
 
dents “how likely do you think it is that enough / 
at least 30% / a majority will agree to donate/vote 
yes?” More respondents thought that it would be 
very unlikely that the voluntary contribution and 
provision point mechanism would lead to enough 
payments. This result raises the question of 
whether the difference in willingness to pay 
across payment vehicles might be due to scenario 
rejection and not incentive incompatibility. We 
use a different interpretation than Champ et al. 
(2002) of respondents’ perceived likelihood of 
funding success. We interpret the likelihood ques-
tion as one of scenario acceptance and consider 
the extent to which the choice of the provision 
point mechanism payment vehicle leads to sce-
nario rejection. We directly measure the effect of 
scenario rejection on willingness to pay with data 
from two surveys. The first is from a survey of 
willingness to pay for a green energy program in 
North Carolina in which the perceived-likelihood-
of-success question is asked prior to the willing-
ness-to-pay question. The second is from a survey 
of willingness to pay for wetlands preservation in 
Michigan in which the perceived-likelihood-of-





Green Energy Survey 
 
The green energy survey was conducted by tele-
phone in all 100 North Carolina counties in 2002 
(Whitehead and Cherry 2007). The response rate 
was 61 percent. The public good generated by the 
hypothetical green energy program is improved 
air quality in the western North Carolina moun-
tains, with three levels of program scope. The 
survey uses the same payment vehicle used by 
Champ and Bishop (2001) and Poe et al. (2002)—a 
voluntary surcharge to the monthly utility bill. 
The magnitude and rationale for the additional 
monthly fee is described below: 
 
In a voluntary Green Energy program, households that 
choose to participate for an extra fee of [$5, $15, $30, or 
$50] each month with their power bills. This fee would 
be fixed and not tax-deductible. The fee would cover the 
higher production costs of green energy. 
 
The fee was randomly assigned to respondents 
and took on one of four values: A = 5, 15, 30, and 
50. Respondents were then asked the amount of 
their average monthly power bill in order to get 
them to assess the impact the monthly fee would 
have. The average monthly power bill was over 
$100. 
  Payment mechanism and policy implementa-
tion rules are described and a dichotomous choice 
willingness-to-pay question is presented below: 
 
If 10 percent of all North Carolina utility customers sign 
up for the green energy program, air pollution would be 
reduced. Recreation, visibility, forest, and stream health 
and human health would improve. If you signed up and 
were not satisfied, you could cancel the program at any 
time. But if less than 10 percent signed up, the green 
energy program would not have enough customers to 
make it cost effective. The program would stop and you 
would owe no money. Suppose you were given the 
opportunity to participate in the green energy program 
for an extra fee of [$5, $15, $30, or $50] dollars each 
month. Would you sign up for the green energy program? 
” Yes     ” No     ” Don’t know 
 
One problem that arises when coding dichoto-
mous choice CVM questions is what to do with 
don’t know responses. We follow the conserva-
tive approach and code all don’t know responses 
as no responses (Groothuis and Whitehead 2002, 
Caudill and Groothuis 2005). 
  Another problem that arises with contingent 
valuation method surveys is hypothetical bias 
(Whitehead and Cherry 2007). Hypothetical bias 
exists if respondents are more likely to say they 
would pay a hypothetical sum of money than to 
actually pay if placed in the real situation. Since 
economic values are revealed by actual behavior, 
hypothetical bias leads to contingent economic 
values that are too high. One method that is used 
to mitigate hypothetical bias is the certainty rating 
(Champ and Bishop 2001). For those respondents 
who said that they were willing to pay, we asked: 
“On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is ‘not sure at all’ 
and 10 is ‘definitely sure’, how sure are you that 
you would make the one-time donation of [$5, 
$15, $30, or $50]?” We code all yes respondents 
who were very certain (7, 8, 9, or 10) as yes re-
spondents, and all others as no respondents. Some 
respondents also receive a budget constraint re-
minder as part of a split sample design. We con-
trol for the split sample design with a dummy 
variable equal to one if the respondent received 
the budget constraint reminder. After this re-
coding, 35 percent of the green energy respon-
dents are willing to pay the bid amount (Table 1). 274    October 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 1. Data Summary 
  Green Energy  Wetlands Preservation 








































Hypothetical bias treatment (=1)  0.33 
(0.47) 
 
Sample size  318  293 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
 
 Before the willingness-to-pay question, we 
asked about perceived aggregate participation in 
the hypothetical green energy program. Respon-
dents were told the goal of the program. 
 
The goal of this program would be to get 10 percent of 
all North Carolina utility customers to sign up. In your 
opinion, how likely do you think it is that 10 percent of 
all North Carolina utility customers would sign up? Do 
you think it is very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat 
not likely, or not likely at all? 
 
  Twenty-three percent thought that the provision 
point was most likely to be met, and 53 percent 
thought it was somewhat likely to be met (Table 
1). Almost three-quarters of the sample thought 
that it was very likely or somewhat likely that 10 
percent would sign up. On the other hand, 16 
percent believed that the provision point was 
somewhat unlikely to be met, and 8 percent 
thought it was most unlikely to be met. This result 
indicates that most respondents found this com-
ponent of the scenario credible. Yet about a quar-
ter may not have found the scenario plausible and 
might have protested the willingness-to-pay ques-
tion with a no response. 
Wetlands Preservation Scenario 
 
The second application used to explore scenario 
rejection is to a wetlands preservation program in 
the Saginaw Bay area of Michigan (Whitehead, 
forthcoming). The survey was conducted by mail 
in the spring of 2005 to both a general population 
sample and a sample of hunting and fishing li-
cense holders who lived in the Saginaw Bay 
counties of Michigan. The response rate was 21 
percent. In contrast to the green energy survey, 
the question about likelihood of success of the 
provision point was presented after the provision 
point mechanism willingness-to-pay question. 
  In the survey, the wetlands, as well as scope of 
preservation, were described. Survey respondents 
were told that 9,000 of 18,000 acres of Saginaw 
Bay coastal marshes are currently protected and 
that the remaining privately owned marshes could 
be purchased and protected. A hypothetical “Sagi-
naw Bay Coastal Marsh Protection Program” was 
introduced: 
 
Voluntary contributions to a “Saginaw Bay Coastal 
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age [1, 125, 2,500, or 4,500] acres of Saginaw Bay 
coastal marshes. The Trust Fund would be administered 
by a board of directors that would include representa-
tives from the federal, state, and local governments, con-
servation and environmental groups, and private land-
owners. Money would be refunded if the total amount is 
not enough to purchase and manage [1, 125, 2,500, or 
4,500] acres. If the amount of donated money is greater 
than the amount required to purchase and manage [1, 
125, 2,500, or 4,500] acres, the extra money would be 
used to provide public access and educational sites at 
Saginaw Bay coastal marshes. 
 
  The payment mechanism and policy implemen-
tation rules were described and the willingness-
to-pay question was presented to the portion of 
the full sample that previously had indicated that 
they would be willing to make a one-time dona-
tion: 
 
If about 1 percent (1 in 100) of all households in Michi-
gan made a one-time donation of $A [$25, $50, $75, 
$100, $150, or $200], the Trust Fund would have enough 
money to purchase and manage [1, 125, 2,500, or 4,500] 
acres of coastal marshes. Remember, if you made a one-
time donation of $A into the Trust Fund, you would have 
$A less to spend on other things. Also remember that 
protected marsh would no longer be available for con-
version to other uses. Under these conditions, would you 
make a one-time donation of $A to the Saginaw Bay 
Coastal Marsh Trust Fund within the next 12 months? 
” Yes     ” No     ” Don’t know 
 
We follow the same recoding procedure as in the 
green energy model for don’t know and uncertain 
yes responses. After recoding the uncertain yes 
respondents, 32 percent of the wetlands preserva-
tion respondents were willing to pay the bid 
amount (Table 1). 
  To test for scenario rejection and determine if 
respondents thought that the provision point 
would be met, we asked a follow-up question to 
the willingness-to-pay question: “How likely do 
you think it is that 1 percent of all households in 
Michigan would make a one-time donation of 
[$25, $50, $75, $100, $150, or $200] to the Trust 
Fund within the next 12 months?” 
  In Table 1, we report the portion of respon-
dents who believe that the provision point will be 
met. We find that 7 percent believe that the provi-
sion point is most likely to be met, while 42 per-
cent believe it is somewhat likely to be met. 
Thirty-six percent, however, believe that the pro-
vision point is somewhat unlikely to be met, and 
14 percent think it is most unlikely that the provi-
sion point will be met. These proportions indicate 
that about half of the respondents find that the 
provision point scenario is plausible. Yet the 
other half to a quarter may not find the scenario 
plausible and might protest the willingness-to-pay 
question with a no response. 
  We also report the means and standard devia-
tions of other variables from both surveys (Table 
1). The average household income of the green 
energy sample is $52,000. The average income of 
the wetlands preservation sample is $52,000. The 
average dollar amounts are $17 and $79 in the 





In Table 2, we consider the relationship between 
acceptance of the provision point scenario and the 
likelihood of saying yes to the willingness-to-pay 
question. For the green energy program we find a 
positive relationship between beliefs that the pro-
vision point is going to be met and a yes response 
to the willingness-to-pay question. We find that 
45 percent of respondents who believe the provi-
sion point will most likely be met would be will-
ing to sign up for the green energy program. The 
proportion of yes responses falls to 34 percent for 
individuals who feel somewhat likely the provi-
sion point will be met, 24 percent for the respon-
dents who thought it was somewhat unlikely the 
provision point would be met, and a low of 19 
percent for those who thought the provision point 
was most unlikely to be met. The differences in 
proportions are statistically significant at the p = 
.05 level using a z-test for the comparison be-
tween those who believe the provision point will 
most likely be met (0.45) and those who thought 
it was (i) somewhat unlikely (0.24) and (ii) most 
unlikely (0.19) to be met. All other differences 
are not statistically significant. 
  We find the same basic pattern for the wetlands 
preservation study, with the exception of the last 
category. We find that the proportion who would 
say  yes to donating starts at 52 percent for re-
spondents who thought the provision point would 
most likely be met. The proportion then falls to 
43 percent for the subset believing that the provi-
sion point was somewhat likely. The proportion 
falls to 17 percent for the individuals who thought 
the provision point was somewhat unlikely to be 276    October 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 2. Willingness-to-Pay Responses by Provision Point Responses 
  Green Energy WTP 
(Yes =1) 
Wetlands Preservation WTP 
(Yes=1) 
















 Note: Sample size in parentheses. 
 
 
met, and then rises to 23 percent for the individu-
als who found it most unlikely that the provision 
point would be met. The differences in propor-
tions are statistically significant at the p = .05 
level using a z-test for the comparison between 
those who believe the provision point would (i) 
most likely be met (0.52) and (ii) somewhat likely 
be met (0.43), and those who thought it would (i)  
somewhat likely be met (0.17) and (ii) most un-
likely (0.23) be met. All other differences are not 
statistically significant. These results suggest that 
individuals who are pessimistic and expect a re-
fund from the provision point process are less 
willing to participate in the first place. This is con-
sistent with the possibility of scenario rejection. 
  In Table 3, we estimate probit models of will-
ingness to pay for each set of data to further 
explore this relationship. We use the natural log 
of the bid ($25, $50, $75, $100, $150, or $200) 
amount to improve the statistical fit. Considering 
first the green energy model, we find that the yes 
responses fall with increases in the log bid 
amount. Increases in income increase the likeli-
hood of saying yes. Those who received the bud-
get-constraint-reminder treatment to help mitigate 
hypothetical bias are less likely to say yes in the 
green energy program. Increases in the scope of 
the green energy program increase the likelihood 
of a yes response. 
  The reference category in both probit models is 
the dummy variable for individuals who believe it 
is most likely the provision point would be met. 
In the green energy model, we find that individu-
als who are less likely to believe that the provi-
sion point will be met have a lower probability of 
responding  yes to the bid amount. The coeffi-
cients are all negative and increase in magnitude 
as individuals are less certain that the provision 
point will be met. The coefficients are all statisti-
cally significant, with the exception of the coeffi-
cient on the dummy of the individuals who find it 
somewhat likely that the provision point would 
pass, suggesting that we are unable to detect a 
difference between those who find the provision 
point most likely to be met and those who find it 
somewhat likely to be met. 
  We further test the equality of coefficients by 
constraining different pairs of dummy variable 
coefficients to be equal. We find that dummy 
variables next to each other in the likelihood scale 
have no statistically significant difference but that 
dummy variables separated by a scale category 
have statistically significant differences. Specifi-
cally, we find a chi-squared test statistic of 2.66, 
which is not statistically significant at the 95 per-
cent level with one degree of freedom, when con-
straining the coefficient to be the same between 
those who thought the provision point was some-
what likely to be met and those who found the 
provision point somewhat unlikely to be met. The 
chi-squared test statistic is 0.72 when constrain-
ing the coefficients to be the same between the 
dummy on the category for those who found the 
provision point somewhat unlikely to be met and 
those who believed the provision point was most 
unlikely to be met. However, the chi-squared test 
statistic of 4.46 is statistically significant when 
constraining the coefficient on the dummy vari-
ables for those who found the provision point to 
be somewhat likely to be met and those who be-
lieved that the provision point was most unlikely 
to be met. These results suggest that the proba-
bility of agreeing to donate is influenced by the 
perception of others’ donation rates. Groothuis and Whitehead  The Provision Point Mechanism and Scenario Rejection in Contingent Valuation   277 
 
 
Table 3. Probit Models of Willingness to Pay  
Green Energy  Wetlands Preservation 
  Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio 
Intercept .261  0.75  1.42  2.40 
Natural log of $A -.335  3.79  -.472  3.86 
Provision point somewhat likely to be met  -.306  1.64  -.264  0.90 
Provision point somewhat unlikely to be met  -.660  2.68  -1.02  3.30 
Provision point most unlikely to be met  -.960  2.81  -.841  2.40 
Hypothetical bias treatment  -.374  2.24     
Scope   .021  2.11  .00002  0.28 
Income .009  3.47  .009  3.07 
χ2  44.74 57.46 
Cases 318  293 
Note: “Provision point very likely to be met” is the excluded category. 
 
 
  These results suggest that scenario rejection has 
an impact on willingness to pay. Individuals who 
do not accept the provision point scenario are 
more likely to say no to the bid amount. If these 
no responses reflect scenario rejection, then will-
ingness to pay is biased downwards, as respon-
dents do not reveal their true willingness to pay. 
  The results from the wetlands preservation 
model are similar. We find that the yes responses 
increase with decreases in the log of the bid 
amount and if the respondent is a conservation or 
environmental organization member (Table 3). 
Individuals who are less likely to believe that the 
provision point will be met are less willing to 
donate the bid amount. The coefficients on all 
dummy variables are negative with increasing 
magnitudes, with the exception of the last dummy 
variable category. We further test the equality of 
coefficients constraining the different dummy 
variable coefficients to be equal. Using the chi-
squared test, we find a test statistic of 15.08, 
which is statistically significant at the 95 percent 
level, when constraining the coefficients between 
those who thought the provision point was 
somewhat likely to be met and those who found 
the provision point somewhat unlikely to be met. 
This result suggests that the crossover from opti-
mism to pessimism in respondent perception that 
the provision point will be met has a significant 
effect on the likelihood of saying yes to the dona-
tion amount. The chi-squared test statistic is 0.25 
when constraining the coefficients between the 
dummy on the category for those who found the 
provision point somewhat unlikely to be met and 
those who believed the provision point most 
unlikely to be met. The chi-squared test statistic is 
a statistically significant 4.68 when constraining 
the coefficient on the dummy variables for those 
who found the provision point to be somewhat 
likely to be met and those who believed that the 
provision point was most unlikely to be met. 
Again, these results suggest that the probability of 
agreeing to donate is influenced by the perception 
of others’ donation rates. 
  These results further suggest that scenario re-
jection has a potential impact on the willingness 
to pay. Individuals who do not believe that the 
provision point will be met are more likely to say 
no to the bid amount. If these no responses reflect 
scenario rejection, then willingness to pay is bi-
ased downwards, as respondents do not reveal 
their true willingness to pay. 
  To understand how the perceived likelihood of 
meeting the provision point influences willing-
ness to pay, we present five estimates where me-
dian willingness to pay is evaluated with all other 
independent variables at their mean (Cameron 
and James 1987, Cameron 1991). In the first col-
umn of Table 4 we report the willingness to pay 
of individuals for the green energy program and, 
in the second column, for the wetlands preserva-
tion program. In the first row, we report the more 278    October 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 4. Willingness-to-Pay Estimates 
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Note: 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses. 
 
 
standard willingness to pay evaluated at the 
means of all variables. This is the willingness-to-
pay estimate that would correspond to a model 
where scenario rejection is not explicitly mod-
eled. In the second row, we evaluate the willing-
ness to pay using zero values inserted for all pro-
vision point dummy variables. This is the will-
ingness-to-pay estimate associated with a sce-
nario where all respondents feel it is most likely 
that the provision point would be met. The will-
ingness-to-pay estimate in the third, fourth, and 
fifth rows is evaluated with the appropriate dummy 
valued at one and all others at zero. 
  The baseline median willingness-to-pay esti-
mates from the green energy and wetlands pres-
ervation models are $4 and $25, respectively. In 
the green energy program the willingness to pay 
climbs to $12 if all respondents feel that the pro-
vision point is most likely to pass, and falls to 
only about $0.70 for respondents who feel that 
the provision point is most unlikely to pass. We 
find that in the wetlands preservation program 
scenario rejection also lowers willingness to pay. 
When the willingness to pay is evaluated for the 
category where respondents feel it is most likely 
to pass, the value is $88, which falls to $49 for 
the category where it is somewhat likely to pass. 
The willingness to pay then falls to $10 when 
evaluated at the somewhat unlikely to be met 
category, and climbs to $15 when evaluated at the 
most unlikely to be met category. The overall re-
sults of the willingness-to-pay exercise show that 
the differing beliefs in the likelihood that the 
provision point will be met influence the amount 
that individuals are willing to donate. The confi-





Although the provision point mechanism in vol-
untary contribution mechanisms to mitigate the 
free-rider problem has shown promise in the labo-
ratory, it is not a familiar fundraising method. The 
potential lack of confidence in government agen-
cies and nongovernmental organizations to suc-
cessfully implement the provision point mecha-
nism may lead to scenario rejection by respon-
dents to CVM surveys. 
  Our results suggest that rejection of the provi-
sion point mechanism scenario may lead to re-
ductions in the number of respondents who are 
willing to pay the bid amount. To the extent that 
the likelihood variable reflects scenario rejection 
and responses that do not reflect true willingness 
to pay, these results suggest that the provision 
point mechanism may lead to scenario rejection 
that biases willingness to pay downward. Our 
results run counter to the finding from experi-
mental economics that the provision point mech-
anism reduces free-riding behavior by giving 
incentives to truthfully reveal preferences. In 
contrast, we find that respondents who feel that 
the provision point will not be met may answer 
with a protest no response. This runs counter to 
the Cadsby and Maynes (1999) result that found 
that high provision points led to more participa-
tion. It is also inconsistent with Norwood et al. Groothuis and Whitehead  The Provision Point Mechanism and Scenario Rejection in Contingent Valuation   279 
 
 
(2006), who find that in a hypothetical survey the 
provision point increases respondents’ propensity 
to donate by a small amount. 
  Our results provide another interpretation of 
Champ et al. (2002), who compare willingness to 
pay in referendum tax, voluntary contribution, 
and voluntary contribution with a provision point 
mechanism payment vehicles in the context of the 
incentive compatibility of the willingness-to-pay 
questions. The additional number of respondents 
that reject the provision point scenario may bias 
willingness to pay downwards. If scenario rejec-
tion is controlled with a perceived likelihood 
variable, and willingness-to-pay estimates are ad-
justed to simulate scenario credibility, referendum 
tax and voluntary contribution with provision 
point mechanism payment vehicles may yield 
similar results. In other words, the differences 
found by Champ et al. (2002) may be due to sce-
nario rejection and not incentive incompatibility. 
  Given that scenario rejection arises with the 
provision point mechanism in voluntary contri-
bution willingness-to-pay surveys, the question 
becomes: What is the correct willingness-to-pay 
estimate? We offer one possible correction by 
calculating willingness to pay when all respon-
dents believe that the provision point will be met. 
Another question that arises is: Do the benefits of 
using the provision point mechanism to mitigate 
the free-rider problem outweigh the cost of sce-
nario rejection? Future research could address 
these issues. Future contingent valuation method 
applications should consider the use of follow-up 
and debriefing questions to (i) identify scenario 
features that cause respondent concern, and (ii) 
exploit these empirical relationships and adjust 
willingness-to-pay estimates accordingly. This is 
especially important in applications of the contin-
gent valuation method that do not have the budg-
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